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This paper lays out the uses of demand curves, both for profit optimization, strategy, tiering and list price setting. This tool is also useful in public policy, such as extending health‐care coverage. It describes how to build a demand curve, and draw useful conclusions.

This paper provides examples of actual demand curves, and how they have been used for new product development, and in out‐maneuvering competitors. Examples are drawn from a number of industries, such as telecom, information services, insurance and electronics, and show how supply and demand are not static, but are highly interactive.

Companies and legislators are not familiar with the demand curves, despite its long history of use in academia. As a result of unfamiliarity with this tool, companies often make costly mistakes in estimates of new product uptake and volumes. If instead of demand curves they rely on price elasticities, companies deprive their senior management of a tool that suggests strategic responses to competitive situations. Surprisingly, many companies have never actually developed a demand curve for their markets.

This article allows managers have not actually seen a real demand curve to see one, and understand what this tool could do for them. It gives examples of new product development and tiering to address multi‐price level markets. In addition, it suggests how public policy makers should focus on shaping supply and demand, rather than imposing floors or ceilings on prices for health‐care coverage. Price ceilings today are responsible for widespread gaps in health care coverage. Finally, the literature on demand curves fails to show how supply and demand are highly interactive.

More than ever, businesses need to assemble and offer multiple products combined into a single offer, a practice known as bundling. The purpose of this paper is to describe how to bundle effectively through analyzing the value of bundle components and the specialized market purpose of a bundle.

In working with many different clients, statistical techniques have helped us draw an interesting conclusion: most bundles—though not all—share a similar structure or taxonomy. At the heart lies the core or anchor element; this is the product or service driving the inquiry. Wrapped around that are those elements which strongly complement the core. The next layer up consists of products or services seen as convenient for the core, but may not always be cost‐effective to include. The final layer of a bundle often turns out to be additions with negative value. These are either substitutes for other bundle components (buyers generally hate being forced to buy two redundant products), or components which have such low relevance to the core that they clutter the value message.

This article examines two dangers to effective bundling: mismatching the various elements of a bundle, and mispricing the offer. We find there are four marketing mistakes which typically stem from mismatches and mispricing: failing to create bundles for special purposes; making bundles too big; using tiering instead of bundles; and failing to innovate on bundle definition.

There is a science to bundles, but it is not widely known or practiced. This science grows in importance as bundling becomes more important, and bundle components become more diverse. Today most bundling is done through judgement and ad hoc initiatives. Frequently such an approach fails to develop an effective bundle, or effectively communicate the value of the bundle. Understanding the taxonomy of a bundle, and the value elements, will allow more diverse and effective product and service combinations.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).